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WHY THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
DOCTRINE IS AN ANACHRONISM (WITH
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO RELIGION,
SPEECH, AND ABORTION)
CASS R. SUNSTEIN*
Many of the most vexing questions in constitutional law result from the
rise of the modem regulatory state, which has allowed government to affect
constitutional rights, not through criminal sanctions, but instead through
spending, licensing, and employment.1 It may well be in these areas that
constitutional doctrine is least well developed. It is here that constitutional
law promises to receive its most serious tests in the next generation.
Under current law, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine serves to
mediate the boundary between constitutional rights and government prerog-
atives in the areas of spending, licensing, and employment.2 The doctrine
operates as a shorthand response to the view that those who voluntarily par-
* Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and Department of
Political Science, University of Chicago. This essay is a revised version of a speech in the
Boston University School of Law Distinguished Lecturer Series, delivered at Boston
University on December 1, 1989. I am most grateful to my hosts at Boston University for
their hospitality and help during that occasion.
I would like to give special thanks to Richard Epstein, Michael McConnell, and
Kathleen Sullivan for their conversation (and writings) on this subject. I am also grateful
to Bruce Ackerman, Mary Becker, Frank Easterbrook, Larry Kramer, Frederick
Schauer, Joseph Singer, and David Strauss for helpful comments.
I Many years ago, Justice Jackson made the basic point:
[T]he task of translating the majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights . . . into
concrete restraints on officials dealing with the problems of the twentieth century, is
one to disturb self-confidence. These principles grew in soil which also produced a
philosophy that the individual['s] ... liberty was attainable through mere absence of
governmental restraints .... We must transplant these rights to a soil in which the
laissez-faire concept or principle of non-interference has withered at least as to
economic affairs, and social advancements are increasingly sought through closer
integration of society and through expanded and strengthened governmental
controls.
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639-40 (1943).
2 In brief, the doctrine holds that although government may choose not to provide
certain benefits altogether, it may not condition the conferral of a benefit, once provided,
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ticipate in government programs have "waived" their constitutional objec-
tions, and also to the claim that the government's power not to create a
regulatory program necessarily includes the power to impose on that pro-
gram whatever conditions it chooses. The various puzzles produced by the
doctrine have created considerable doctrinal confusion and provoked a wide
range of commentary.' It is notable that for all their differences, participants
in the debate, both on and off the bench, treat the unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine as the appropriate device for approaching disputed questions.
The differences can be found not on that point, but only in the description of
the scope and nature of the doctrine.'
This Article comes in two parts. In Part I, I argue that the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine should be abandoned. The doctrine, I suggest, is
an anachronism; it cannot do th work expected of it. During the transition
from the common law system to the modern regulatory state,' the unconsti-
tutional conditions doctrine represented an awkward and never fully expli-
cated effort to protect constitutional rights in a dramatically different
institutional environment. The peculiar legacy of this transition and its out-
moded foundations continue to pervade current approaches to the problem
of unconstitutional conditions. The idea that the system of common law and
criminal prohibition provides the basic, even natural state of affairs, and that
on a beneficiary's waiver of a constitutional right. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-8, at 681 & n.29 (2d ed. 1988).
a See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 10-8, at 681-85, § 10-9, at 685-87 (discussing the
subsidy-penalty distinction); Epstein, Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power
and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988) (arguing that the doctrine serves
as a second-best means of prohibiting illegitimate redistributions of wealth); Kreimer,
Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 1293, 1359 (1984) (proposing three baselines from which to assess the validity of
allocational sanctions); Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413,
1419 (1989) (arguing that the doctrine serves an important function by "identify[ing] a
characteristic technique by which government appears not to, but in fact does burden...
liberties"); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1448 (1968) (noting that "government-connected activity
... may make otherwise unreasonable conditions quite reasonable").
I The analysis in Sullivan, supra note 3, is closest to that suggested here, particularly in
her rejection of the subsidy-penalty distinction. Id. at 1433-38. My claim is that
arguments of the sort that she offers, properly understood, would lead in the direction of
abandonment of the doctrine altogether.
5 I use the term "regulatory state" because it is the usual one, but the term should not
be taken to suggest that the common law system that preceded it was not "regulatory" or
"governmental" in largely the same sense. Indeed, the idea that the common law was a
regulatory system, and not merely facilitative of private desires, played a role in the
creation of the modern state. See Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101
HARV. L. REV. 421, 437 (1987) (noting that many New Deal reformers regarded the
common law itself as a regulatory scheme).
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regulatory and spending programs are occasional and somewhat jarring
additions, affects all sides of the debate.
Indeed, the very idea of a unitary unconstitutional conditions doctrine is a
product of the view that the common law is the ordinary course and that
governmental "intervention"-the regulatory state-is exceptional.6
Despite its pervasiveness,7 this view is misconceived. It is inconsistent with
both the realities of contemporary government and the principles that gave
rise to it. Instead of a general unconstitutional conditions doctrine asking
whether there has been "coercion" or "penalty," what is necessary is a
highly particular, constitutionally-centered model of reasons: an approach
that asks whether, under the provision at issue, the government has constitu-
tionally sufficient justifications for affecting constitutionally protected
interests.
In the second part of this Article, I explore the constitutional issues raised
in several areas of selective funding. My goal is to show the sort of analysis
that would be used in a legal system that has abandoned the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine. I conclude that government may constitutionally fund
public but not private schools; that government has broad discretion to be
selective in funding art and other projects involving speech; and, perhaps
most controversially, that government is under a constitutional duty to fund
abortion in cases of rape and incest, at least if it is funding childbirth in such
cases. Whether or not these conclusions are correct, the relevant outcomes
should depend on reasons entirely independent of a general unconstitutional
conditions doctrine. It is on that broader point, rather than the particular
conclusions, that I will be insisting here.
I. CURRENT DOCTRINE AND ITS LIMITS
To make the analysis as concrete as possible, I will focus throughout on
three cases involving selective funding. In the first, government decides to
fund public schools but not private schools, and it does so even though there
is a constitutional right to send one's children to private schools.8 In the
second case, government funds some artistic projects but not others, exclud-
ing, for example, projects containing sex or nudity, criticizing the govern-
ment, or proclaiming the virtues of Nazism or Communism. In the third,
government funds childbirth but not abortion in cases in which pregnancy
results from rape or incest. In this section, I explore what sort of directions
the current understandings of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine might
provide in these cases.
6 For an elaboration of this point, see Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
873 (1987).
7 Id. at 875.
8 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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A. The Rise of the Regulatory State and the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine
I have said that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is an artifact of
the collision of the regulatory-welfare state with the preexisting common law
framework. To understand that claim, it will be useful briefly to review the
collision. Most of the story will be familiar.
In the early days of the regulatory state, legislation that is now generally
taken as constitutionally uncontroversial-for example, minimum wage and
maximum hour legislation-was subject to attack under the due process
clause, usually as a form of an impermissible "taking" from one person for
the benefit of another.9 On this account, the distribution of wealth and enti-
tlements pursuant to the common law and market ordering was treated as a
part of nature, or at least as the baseline from which to assess whether gov-
ernment had violated its obligation of neutrality. It was on this premise that
the idea of impermissible redistribution was made plausible.' ° The Lochner
decision, invalidating maximum hour laws, has come to be the symbol of this
approach to constitutional law.
Before and during the New Deal period, this framework came under
assault. The common law system began to be seen not as a natural or impar-
tial order, but as a set of collective choices. Because market outcomes were
at least in large part a function of the law itself, employers were no longer
seen to have an antecedent entitlement to market wages and market hours."
Thus Franklin Roosevelt contended, "We must lay hold of the fact that the
laws of economics are not made by nature. They are made by human
beings."' 2 The rise of the regulatory state represented a general understand-
' See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (overturning state legislation setting
maximum hours for bakers); Adkins v. Childrens Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 557-58 (1923)
(striking down a minimum wage statute as "a compulsory exaction from the employer for
the support of a partially indigent person").
10 Of course not all redistribution was out of bounds; welfare statutes were permitted.
But redistribution through regulation was quite frequently invalidated. Note, however,
that such efforts do in fact have perverse effects in many cases. For a catalogue, see
Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 407 (1990).
"1 See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) (rejecting Lochner's
freedom of contract premise and stating that "[t]he community is not bound to provide
what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable employers").
12 F.D. Roosevelt, Annual Message to Congress (Jan. 3, 1936), in 5 THE PUnLIC
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, THE PEOPLE APPROVE 13
(1938). This was also a prominent theme in the legal realist movement. See, e.g., Hale,
Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. Scl. Q. 470, 478
(1923) (arguing that the distribution of income "depends on the relative power of
coercion which the different members of the community can exert against one another").
A large failure of the realists was that they thought that this insight did more work than
in fact it does. To say that existing distributions are a product of law or a "social
construct" is not to supply an argument against them. Some such argument, sounding in
[Vol. 70:593
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ing that the common law and private markets were regulatory systems and
that those systems sometimes produced both inefficiency and injustice.
At its inception, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine was a product of
Lochner-like, pre-New Deal understandings. Its overriding purpose was to
protect common law rights in the face of threats to those rights created by
the rise of the regulatory state.13 The doctrine arose when it became clear
that regulatory and spending activities might produce an impermissible
"redistribution" of the Lochner variety, 4 and that doctrines could be
designed to control these novel intrusions into what had previously been
regarded as a private sphere. The Court might, for example, invalidate a
statute conditioning the receipt of funds on compliance with minimum wage
laws. From its inception, then, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
grew out of a system that sought to protect common law interests and mar-
ket ordering from the novel threats created by the regulatory state. Each of
the three principal positions about the scope and nature of the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine continue to reflect the roots of the doctrine in the
uneasy encounter of constitutional courts with the regulatory state.
1. Holmesianism
The first position, traceable to Justice Holmes15 but with several modem
incarnations,' 6 suggests that courts should never, or almost never, invalidate
arguably unconstitutional conditions. On this view, the supposedly greater
power not to create the program includes the supposedly lesser power to
impose the condition. The Holmesian view begins by acknowledging that an
efficiency or distributive justice, is necessary to support displacement of freedom of
contract or indeed of any system.
11 See Epstein, supra note 3, at 10 (stating that the doctrine, with roots in the
nineteenth century, is "no new judicial concoction in the post-New Deal welfare state");
Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1416 (noting that "the Lochner Court first fashioned the
doctrine").
14 See infra text accompanying notes 21-31 for a discussion of how this theme survives
in current doctrine.
15 See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(arguing that if Congress may create an office at will, it may also condition termination
from that office); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 53 (1910) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("Even in the law the whole generally includes its parts. If the State may
prohibit, it may prohibit with the privilege of avoiding the prohibition in a certain way.");
McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 518 (1892)
("There are few employments for hire in which the servant does not agree to suspend his
constitutional right of free speech ... by the terms of his contract.").
16 See, e.g., Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the
Production of Information, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 309, 344-52 (discussing with approval the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine as applied to Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507
(1980), in which the Court enforced the CIA's contractual right to censor books by its
former agents); Lyng v. International Union, 485 U.S. 360 (1988) (upholding legislation
denying distribution of food stamps to striking workers).
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important lesson of the Lochner period was that constitutional courts should
not treat the existing distribution of entitlements pursuant to the common
law as sacrosanct. Justice Holmes treated the rejection of the Lochner
framework-the basic ordering principle for the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine-as entailing the abandonment of the doctrine as well.
On this view, the only logical replacement for the doctrine is untrammeled
governmental discretion in the areas of employment, licensing, and funding.
That is: when a citizen participates in a program to which there is no ante-
cedent entitlement, the Constitution imposes no constraints on the govern-
ment's decision to impose conditions. It would follow that, for example, the
government might award grants to artists as it chooses. Indeed, under the
Holmesian view, all three of the cases with which I started become simple
ones. The government wins.
This position represents a distinctive reaction to the rise of the regulatory
state. It takes the New Deal repudiation of common law baselines as a rea-
son to abandon baselines, and to this (significant) extent constitutionalism,
altogether. But for familiar reasons, the rise of the regulatory state need not
compel the complete elimination of constraints on governmental activities
that pressure what would otherwise qualify as constitutional rights.' The
Constitution constrains not simply criminal law, but all governmental con-
duct. If government could, for example, limit spending programs to those
who speak favorably of the party in power, there would be a serious distor-
tion of deliberative processes--one that creates precisely the same dangers,
in terms of both purposes and effects, against which the first amendment was
originally supposed to guard. Governmental conditions on the receipt of
licenses or funds may have powerful distorting effects on (for example) free-
dom of expression'" or racial equality.' 9 All this suggests that in its broadest
forms, the Holmesian position is unacceptable. It eliminates constitutional
protections from spending, licensing, and employment decisions, without
providing a plausible explanation for so doing.
More fundamentally, and perhaps surprisingly, the Holmesian position is
a legacy of precisely the pre-New Deal understandings that it purports to
repudiate. On the Holmesian View, coercive governmental entry into the
17 There has been broad agreement on the importance of inquiring into the burdens
that governmental activities place on rights. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 3, at 7-8;
Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1500; Van Alstyne, supra note 3, at 1442. See also infra text
accompanying notes 46-53.
18 See, e.g., FCC v. League of Woman Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (holding that a
federal regulation conditioning the award of grants upon public broadcasters' willingness
to refrain from editorializing violates the first amendment).
19 See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (striking down a municipal
ordinance prohibiting the construction of wooden laundries without a license, where the
effect of the condition was to discriminate against Chinese applicants). On the
inadequacy of "the greater includes the lesser" position, see infra note 48 and text
accompanying notes 47-54.
[Vol. 70:593
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realm of private autonomy may raise constitutional objections; spending and
benefit programs do not. This view thus implements constitutional princi-
ples by reference to the discredited distinction between a pre-political sphere
of common law autonomy and a post-political sphere of governmental
action. 20 After the New Deal, however, governmental benefit and spending
programs cannot plausibly be viewed as a regulatory system superimposed
upon a set of spontaneous or natural arrangements-a central lesson of the
demise of Lochner. If this is so, the sharp line that the Holmesian position
draws between the common law and the regulatory sphere depends on
assumptions and values that are inconsistent with those of modem
government.
2. Anti-redistribution
The second position was prominent in the early twentieth century; though
it has echoes in many places," it has perhaps only one full-fledged defender
today.2' Here the connection between the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine and its earliest pre-New Deal manifestations is perhaps clearest.
This view conceives the basic goal of the doctrine as preservation and pro-
tection of Lochner-like rights, such as contractual liberty and private prop-
erty, under new circumstances. As elaborated at length by Richard
Epstein,2" the unconstitutional conditions doctrine operates as a second-best
surrogate for outright prohibition, on constitutional grounds, of spending
and taxing programs.24 Sometimes, for example, the doctrine applies for the
same reason that the underlying program is unconstitutional as "redistribu-
tion";' sometimes it applies because even if courts were to uphold such a
redistributive program, they can minimize the redistributive consequences
through control of the "indirect" constraints imposed by the conditions. In
its early twentieth-century incarnation, and in Epstein's own version, this
idea grows out of the same framework that accounted for Lochner v. New
York and various other decisions invalidating modern legislation.2 6
20 See Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 6, at 882.
21 For a recent example, see Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 438 U.S. 825
(1987) (holding the Commission's conditioning the right to develop private beachfront
property on landowner's providing public easement to be an invalid taking of property).
22 See Epstein, supra note 3, for the basic statement and defense.
23 Id.
24 Epstein writes that the doctrine functions to " 'take back' some of the power which
had been conferred upon government officials in the first instance." Id. at 28.
25 For example, Epstein argues that "government regulation and taxation are means to
effect implicit transfers of wealth between individuals." Id. at 103. As one commentator
has noted, for Epstein "as a matter of principle, the whole social security and welfare
safety net is unconstitutional." Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 21, 23 (1986).
26 See, e.g., Adkins, 261 U.S. at 557-58 (minimum wage statute is a "compulsory
exaction from the employer for the support of a partially indigent person"). Of course
Epstein would accord constitutional protection, under the unconstitutional conditions
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This understanding of the doctrine would suggest-to take one example-
that a government that funds public schools must also fund private schools.
On this account, some version of a voucher system, in which the government
would also finance students who chose to attend religious schools, would be
constitutionally compelled.' If government funds only public schools, it
works an impermissible redistribution from one group of taxpayers to
another; and it is redistribution against which the doctrine must guard.
It should not be difficult to see why this approach is unacceptable. First,
no constitutional provision forbids "redistribution., 28 After the demise of
the Lochner period,' the Constitution has been interpreted to authorize a
wide range of transfers from some groups to others, largely on the under-
standing that existing distributions of wealth and property are not sacro-
sanct. When a "redistribution" is unconstitutional, it is not because of any
general constitutional disability, but because particular constitutional provi-
sions rule particular government acts, some of them of course "redistribu-
tive," off-limits. For example, a welfare program limited to members of the
Republican party is impermissible because of the specific constraints of the
first amendment. An unconstitutional conditions doctrine rooted in an anti-
redistributive norm is simply too general a framework for approaching a
constitutional system that offers quite concrete prohibitions.
doctrine, to rights of free speech and free exercise as well as to rights of property
ownership and contractual freedom. In all cases, however, the basic reason for protection
is his fear of governmental "redistribution"-an impermissible goal that, in Epstein's
framework, cuts across a wide range of constitutional protections. Because Epstein
would grant protection to modern rights of this sort, his approach is not limited to
Lochner-like rights of property and contract; but the reasons for the protection of other
rights stem precisely from the Lochner framework. That framework accounts for some
other oddities in his analysis as well, such as the suggestion that taxpayers with religious
objections have a constitutional right to prevent their funds from being used for abortion.
Epstein, supra note 3, at 97.
27 See L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1275.
28 The takings clause is of course anti-redistributive, but it has never been and should
not be taken as a wholesale assault on all governmental action with redistributive
consequences. For a contrary view, see R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY
AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (arguing that the concept of private
property is inconsistent with a welfare state and that the takings clause itself prohibits
public transfers and welfare programs).
The notion of "redistribution" itself depends on a theory of antecedent entitlements. If
existing distributions are themselves without prepolitical status, and if they are
questionable from the standpoint of justice, efforts to change them will not appear to be
"redistribution" at all. See T. POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS (1989) (arguing that
institutional orders themselves establish inequities that result from collective actions in
creating and perpetuating these orders).
29Notably, there was no general barrier to redistribution in the founding period. See
Grey, supra note 25, at 41-42 (arguing that the "duty of public support for the destitute"
is a consistent theme in Western thought and that the framers left this "familiar system"
undisturbed).
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More fundamentally, the second position, rooted as it is in Lochner,
depends on conceptions of the purpose of the state and the correlative judi-
cial role30 that have been roundly repudiated in the twentieth century, and
for good reasons."1 It is here that one can find a surprising but firm alliance
between Holmesianism, minimally intrusive on governmental power, and the
anti-redistributive position, maximally intrusive on such power. For all their
differences, both positions draw a sharp distinction between the realm of
common law autonomy and the realm of public law. Both positions under-
stand the unconstitutional conditions doctrine by reference to precisely that
distinction. But barring a return to Lochner, redistributive and paternalistic
programs are no longer constitutionally out-of-bounds. An unconstitutional
conditions doctrine built on pre-New Deal foundations is poorly adapted to
the regulatory state.
3. Subsidy vs. Penalty
The third position, represented by the current constitutional main-
stream,32 sees the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as an effort to pre-
serve legal requirements of governmental neutrality under different social
and economic conditions. It is in this requirement of government neutrality
that one finds the staples of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine: the
government may not do indirectly what it may not do directly; government
may not "penalize" the exercise of constitutional rights; and government
may not coerce people into relinquishing constitutional rights through regu-
lation, spending, and licensing, any more than it may do so through criminal
sanctions.
These are the conventional arguments in the cases.' In some respects,
30 For Epstein, that role is to preserve economic liberties and private property.
Epstein, supra note 3, at 103.
31 J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) and B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN
THE LIBERAL STATE (1980) provide philosophical treatments within the liberal tradition.
For an analysis along similar lines with particular focus on the appropriate scope of
regulation, see C. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1990).
32 Every Supreme Court justice has set forth a position of this sort within the last two
decades. For a careful elaboration of the basic principles here, see Kreimer, supra note 3.
3 See, e.g., Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229 (1987) (holding
invalid a tax benefitting "fledgling" publisher because it burdens the first amendment
rights of other publishers); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1983)
(invalidating a section of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 which banned
noncommercial television stations who receive grants from the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting from "editorializing"); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding that
due process does not require states to pay for medically necessary abortions for
indigents); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that conditioning receipt of
unemployment benefits on recipient's willingness to work on the Sabbath contrary to
religious beliefs violates the first amendment); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
(holding that conditioning receipt of welfare benefits on durational residency
requirements violates the equal protection clause).
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they are highly salutary, especially insofar as they recognize the possibility
that non-criminal sanctions often affect constitutional rights in ways that
government is unable to justify. Above all, these ideas operate as a correc-
tive both to approaches that see common law rights as the general baseline
against which an unconstitutional conditions doctrine must operate, and
those who, following Holmes, suggest that courts should not limit the intru-
sions on constitutional rights that occur through spending and employment
decisions.
In many respects, however, this third approach is vulnerable, not least
because in finding the regulatory state a strange and intermittent intruder, it
has far more in common with Lochner-like ideas than appears at first glance.
The approach thus poses several problems. The first is that generating the
appropriate baselines from which to distinguish subsidies from penalties is
exceptionally difficult. 4  Harris v. McRae,' in which the Supreme Court
upheld a government decision to fund childbirth but not to fund medically
necessary abortions, illustrates the problem. There the Court said that Con-
gress' decision not to fund abortions through the Medicaid program was
permissible because it amounted to a mere refusal to subsidize. The Court
acknowledged that a "penalty" would be unconstitutional because it would
impermissibly burden a woman's constitutionally protected right to an abor-
tion. For example, a decision to withdraw welfare benefits from everyone
who has had an abortion would, the Court noted, raise "a substantial consti-
tutional question."'
But how does one decide whether the refusal to pay for medically neces-
sary abortions is a "subsidy" or a "penalty" in the face of government fund-
ing of childbirth and almost all other medically necessary expenditures?
Perhaps government action should be deemed a penalty rather than a sub-
sidy when the government prevents someone from obtaining something to
which she would "otherwise" be entitled. This formulation, however, makes
the distinction between "subsidy" and "penalty," like the very category of
''coercion," rely on a baseline defining the ordinary or desirable state of
affairs." The courts must rely on some status quo to decide what people
would "otherwise" receive. In a post-Medicaid world, is not a poor woman
seeking an abortion "otherwise" entitled to payment for medically necessary
expenditures, including abortions? The Harris dissenters made precisely this
34 See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1416-17.
35 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
36 Id. at 317 n.19.
11 See, e.g., Kreimer, supra note 3, at 1358-59 ("Our problem ... lies in the challenge
to specify an appropriate normal course of events from which to judge deviations.");
Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD 440, 447 (S. Morgenbesser,
P. Suppes & M. White eds. 1969) (suggesting that "threats" involve a departure from a
baseline of the "normal course of events," that detriment the recipient); Sullivan, supra
note 3, at 1439-40 (arguing that outcomes change depending on how baselines are
defined).
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argument.3a The majority replied that there had never been a general entitle-
ment to funding of all medically necessary treatments. 9 The dissenters
might have answered that the existence of a Medicaid program altered the
baseline to one containing such a general entitlement. But the majority
might have responded: Why?
All this suggests that the development of the relevant baseline is enor-
mously difficult. In Harris, the Court appeared quite reflexively to use a
common law baseline that assumed government funding to be exceptional
rather than ordinary,' but the common law may simply no longer be appro-
priate in these cases. Once the common law touchstone is abandoned, how-
ever, it is not at all clear what standard is to replace it. If the subsidy-
penalty line is crucial, development of proper baselines is the key issue; but it
is also an issue on which the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and the
subsidy-penalty distinction, standing by themselves, have absolutely nothing
to say.41
The problem goes deeper. Sometimes, as I argue below, the government
can legitimately "penalize" the exercise of constitutional rights through
selective funding.' Some constitutional provisions do indeed permit regula-
tion through funding but not through criminalization. It is hardly self-evi-
dent, in any case, that all penalties must be unconstitutional.
This point leads to the broader conclusion that the development of a base-
line to distinguish between penalties and subsidies is neither necessary nor
sufficient.4' The Constitution offers no general protection against the impo-
sition of penalties on the exercise of rights. Instead, the question the Consti-
tution ordinarily makes it necessary to ask is whether government has
intruded on a right in a way that is constitutionally troublesome and, if so,
whether government can justify its intrusion under the appropriate standard
of review. The view that there is a unitary category of intrusions called
"unconstitutional conditions" is the product of a belief that in a certain set
of cases, another question-"subsidy/penalty"--displaces the ordinary
inquiry altogether. But it is not at all clear why this displacement should
occur.
Even more fundamentally, the very notion that one should approach these
cases with a distinction between penalties and subsidies has much in com-
38 Harris, 448 U.S. at 330-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Kreimer, supra note 3,
at 1375-76 (noting that "[a]s a matter of history," abortions were funded prior to Harris).
39 Harris, 448 U.S. at 317-18.
40 Thus the Harris majority writes that "[t]he Hyde Amendment leaves an indigent
woman with at least the same range of choice in deciding whether to obtain a medically
necessary abortion as she would have had if Congress had chosen to subsidize no health
care costs at all." Id. at 316.
41 See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1420.
41 The clearest example is government's decision not to fund private schools. See infra
text accompanying notes 54-59.
43 See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1450.
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mon with the two positions that appear to be its adversaries. As with the
Holmesian and anti-redistributive approaches, the subsidy-penalty distinc-
tion appears to depend on the notion that the regulatory state is an artificial
supplement to an otherwise well-defined status quo. The distinction simply
cannot be administered without some such notion." Moreover, the distinc-
tion cannot be sustained in light of the omnipresence of government spend-
ing and funding. A set of doctrines that assumes that spending programs
are an artificial supplement to a system of common law ordering-in short,
an inquiry into subsidy or penalty-is inconsistent with the values and oper-
ation of modem government.
All three of the prominant approaches to the subject are too general to be
helpful in dealing with cases involving particular prohibitions on govern-
ment activity. Moreover, they are anachronisms. And they are anachro-
nisms in precisely the same sense: they treat common law ordering as the
usual state of affairs and see governmental funding as a questionable interfer-
ence with an otherwise stable status quo. To be sure, such interference
might well raise serious constitutional problems. But nothing in the uncon-
stitutional conditions doctrine is likely to be helpful in resolving those
problems.
B. Plausible Functions of Current Doctrine, and Why They Can Be
Served in Other Ways
The discussion thus far suggests that the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine has taken the shape that it has and produced the debates that it has
only in reaction to a set of particular, quite distinctive historical conditions.
In short, the doctrine filled a particular gap in post-New Deal constitutional
theory by offering a means of placing limits on novel governmental activities.
We might make this point by imagining a different society in which collec-
tive constraints were, from time immemorial, carried out through licensing,
funding, and employment decisions. In such a society, the criminal law
would be absent, and constitutional safeguards would be applied to the
familiar kinds of sanctions. Suppose that after many generations, the society
created a new set of sanctions--call them criminal fines and confinement-
as a supplement to its basic regulatory system.
Such a society might at that point find it necessary to create a set of doc-
trines to control this novel kind of intrusion, one that sometimes adversely
44 Although this is usually so, it is not necessarily so as a logical matter. At least in
theory, one could define the status quo not by reference to current practice or to history,
but instead by reference to some baseline justified as a matter of principle. But there
would be enormous difficulties in establishing the foundations for any such justification.
Cf Kreimer, supra note 3, at 1359-74 (developing a baseline analysis grounded in
considerations of history, equality, and prediction); Simons, Offers, Threats, and
Unconstitutional Conditions, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 289 (1989) (arguing that the proper
baseline for measuring threats and offers is what the government would have provided if
it could not impose conditions).
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affected constitutional rights. Once the society matured, however, the cate-
gory of criminalization would no longer be administered as a unitary doc-
trine. It would instead take its place alongside the more familiar
constitutional safeguards that inquire into the nature of the burden on the
relevant rights and the available government justifications for imposing that
burden.
For modern observers, then, the question has to do with what genuine,
nonobfuscating work the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is necessary to
perform. I suggest here that it is possible to identify three such functions.
But because the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is not necessary to dis-
charge these tasks, and because the tasks can be carried out through other,
more particular, approaches, I argue that the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine should be abandoned.45
1. Identifying a Technique of Burdening
The first function the unconstitutional conditions doctrine performs is to
identify a technique by which government affects or burdens constitutional
rights.6 The doctrine serves to alert courts to the fact that a government
spending decision-for example, a decision to condition the receipt of wel-
fare benefits on a waiver of first or fourth amendment rights-often affects
constitutional rights in ways that call for persuasive justification or perhaps
invalidation.
The doctrine thus reminds courts that it would be quite wrong to disre-
gard the effects that spending decisions may have on constitutional rights,
even if there is an apparent or real individual waiver. But the fact that
spending decisions do affect constitutional rights should hardly be thought
surprising or unusual. A reminder of the possibility that constitutionally
troublesome burdens can be imposed through spending, licensing, or regula-
tion is necessary only to those who hold an outmoded view of what modern
government does.
2. Responding to Persistent Arguments
The second function of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is to pro-
vide a shorthand and sometimes persuasive response to two familiar argu-
ments. The first is that if government has no duty to create a program at all,
it may create the program with certain conditions. The greater power, in
short, necessarily includes the lesser. The second argument invokes the lan-
guage of voluntariness. If, for example, a person has freely chosen to forego
45 It would follow that the approaches in Kreimer, supra note 3, and L. TRIBE, supra
note 2, are misguided, and for the same reason. It remains true, however, that there will
be some commonalities in judicial treatment of constitutional attacks on funding and
licensing decisions, once those attacks are seen as raising not unconstitutional conditions
questions, but instead, for example, first, fifth, and fourteenth amendment questions.
46 Emphasized in Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1419.
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rights of free speech in order to work for the government, it might be
thought that the courts have no reason to intervene.
Unpacking what is right and what is wrong in these two arguments
requires substantial work.47 The unconstitutional conditions doctrine serves
as a brief response to these arguments in their crudest forms. It responds to
the implausible idea that the government's power not to create the program
necessarily includes the power to impose whatever condition it chooses, and
to the equally implausible idea that there can never be a constitutional obsta-
cle to an arguably or actually voluntary individual choice. But the implausi-
bility of these arguments, in their broadest forms, should be self-evident
under modern conditions. The short response is that it is often irrelevant
that the government need not fund at all or that the recipient accepted the
condition. The Constitution limits the reasons for which government may
act and the effects of its actions. A welfare program limited to Democrats is
unconstitutional because of the first amendment; points about voluntary par-
ticipation and the "greater power" are simply a diversion.4 Courts do not
need an unconstitutional conditions doctrine in order to make the necessary
response. Whether the greater power includes the lesser, and whether there
is a legal obstacle to an apparently free choice, depend on a reading of the
constitutional provision at issue, not on shorthand phrases.
3. The Character of Substantive Rights and the Nature of
Government Justifications
The third function of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is to reveal
something true, important, and perhaps surprising about the character of
some substantive rights and the nature of government justifications. In
short, the doctrine reveals that some constitutional rights are not rights to
government neutrality at all. In some contexts, government has available to
it certain justifications that allow it to be selective in decisions with respect
to funding, licensing, or employment.
47 See Epstein, supra note 3, at 60-64; Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1420.
48 To say this is not to deny the need to develop quite concrete responses, which will
vary with context. For example, a citizen might voluntarily agree to waive her right to
free speech in return for welfare benefits, and be better off as a result. The constitutional
question, however, is not whether she is better off in the abstract, but instead whether she
is better off, or equally well off, with respect to the right in question. The fact that an offer
to purchase the right to free speech in return for welfare benefits might make the recipient
better off under Paretian criteria hardly disposes of the constitutional question-at least
not if the right is to government neutrality.
To take another example: Waivers of constitutional rights may be individually rational
but have large adverse structural or systemic consequences. That is, governmental
purchase of the right to vote, or the right to free speech, undermines the first
amendment's broad protection not only of individual autonomy, but also of certain forms
of government. See Sunstein, Government Control of Information, 74 CALIF. L. REV.
889, 915 (1986).
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The point is a bit obscure in the abstract, but it emerges quite naturally
from the cases. Consider, for example, a statute through which the govern-
ment provides medical benefits only to those who agree to speak for a Demo-
cratic presidential candidate, and to speak against the Republican candidate.
Such a statute would be unconstitutional. The right to free expression is a
right to government neutrality as among competing ideas. It does not mat-
ter whether government violates the neutrality requirement by imposing
criminal prohibitions or by providing cash payments.
By contrast, imagine-a case in which the government pays for secondary
education, but only for those who send their children to the public schools.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to include a right to
send one's children to private schools;49 but that right operates only against
criminal sanctions, and not against the incentive effects to which parents
are subject when government funds public but not private education. This
understanding of the relevant right is controversial, but it is perfectly intelli-
gible. In some cases, the government has legitimate and distinctive interests
that permit it to engage in conduct on the spending side that would be
impermissible on the criminal side. In the spending context, the government
may be able to invoke justifications that are tightly connected to, and
become legitimate because of, the very fact that it is engaging in those activi-
ties. In the public school setting, for example, government can plausibly
justify its selectivity by the need to ensure that public funds are not spent on
religious activities.
There are other examples as well. In Snepp v. United States,5x the
Supreme Court upheld the use of secrecy agreements to regulate speech by
employees of the Central Intelligence Agency. The best argument for this
result is that in its capacity as manager of an intelligence agency, the govern-
ment has legitimate interests, not related to censorship in the ordinary sense,
that justify restrictions on the speech of those who have access to sensitive
information. Similarly, a possible argument, taken up below, for the out-
come in Harris would be that the government can properly consider taxpay-
ers' religious and moral objections to the practice of abortion in deciding
what sorts of medically necessary operations it will fund. 2
Lyng v. International Union5 3 offers a final example. In Lyng, the
Supreme Court upheld an amendment to the Food Stamp Act prohibiting
strikers from receiving food stamp benefits. A plausible argument for this
outcome would rely on the proposition that even if the government cannot
49 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
10 In Pierce, the sanction involved a state statute making it a misdemeanor for parents
not to send their children to public schools. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972) (holding that the state may not enforce a criminal statute against Amish families
refusing to send children to public school beyond the eighth grade).
51 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
52 See infra text accompanying notes 69-77.
M 485 U.S. 360 (1988).
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forbid strikes through criminal punishment, it may allocate scarce resources
to those who are genuinely in need. The government, on this view, may
legitimately conclude that strikers are not in need in the same sense as are
most unemployed people.
To say all this is not to supply a decisive argument in favor of Snepp,
Harris, or Lyng. It is, however, to suggest that whether the issue is one of
funding, licensing, or employment, the government may have distinctive and
unusual justifications to support what are by hypothesis constitutionally
troubling burdens on protected rights. It is on this point that current doc-
trine contains a core and unavoidable insight: Funding, regulating, and
licensing decisions are indeed sometimes different from criminal
punishment.
But is an unconstitutional conditions doctrine necessary to accomplish
this task? It would be far more straightforward to ask whether the govern-
ment has available to it distinctive justifications because of the context in
which the relevant burden is imposed. Nothing in the unconstitutional con-
ditions doctrine is helpful in answering that question, or even in suggesting
the need to ask it. The doctrine should be abandoned.
II. BEYOND THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE
Thus far my discussion has been quite general. I have argued in favor of a
shift from an emphasis on whether there has been "coercion" or "penalty"
to an inquiry into the nature of the interest affected by government and the
reasons offered by government for its intrusion. The inquiry into both inter-
ests and reasons is not unconstrained. The Constitution identifies a
restricted category of protected rights and limits the category of justifica-
tions that government may offer.
In this Part, I attempt to give more particular content to these general
suggestions. The discussion will be tentative and exploratory, attempting to
structure inquiries rather than to offer final answers. One might of course
accept my general claims about the anachronistic and unhelpful character of
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, and about the need to shift from
coercion to reasons, without at the same time accepting my particular
conclusions.
There will be two cross-cutting themes. The first and most important is
the need for attention to the constitutional provision at issue. In all of the
cases, the question is whether the measure at issue interferes with a constitu-
tional right, properly characterized, and, if so, whether the government has
sufficient justification for its interference. These questions cannot be
answered in the abstract. Different conclusions will be appropriate under
different provisions. A major problem with the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine is that it diverts attention from this fact, and indeed from the partic-
ular provision in question.
The second theme concerns the relevance for constitutional purposes of
moral or conscientious objections to spending decisions by segments of the
[Vol. 70:593
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taxpaying public. In general, such objections often provide a legitimate rea-
son for funding decisions. What is the status of those objections in funding
that involves constitutionally troublesome areas? Perhaps surprisingly, I
argue that for the most part, moral objections ought not to play a significant
role.
A. Public Schools, Private Schools
We have seen that under current law, government is constitutionally
obliged to permit people to send their children to private schools; but it is
under no obligation to fund private schools even if it pays for public schools.
Neutrality as between public and private schools is not a constitutional
imperative.' Financial pressures that induce people to send their children
to public school raise no constitutional problem.
The fact that the Constitution permits nonneutrality here is something of
a puzzle. But for two reasons, the conventional wisdom is probably correct.
First, the right to send one's children to private schools-rooted in the free
exercise clauseS---is an unusual one in light of the functions of the establish-
ment clause. By prohibiting the government from establishing religion, the
first amendment imposes a special disability on religion. In that sense, the
Constitution is not neutral as between religion and nonreligion. Under the
establishment clause, an exaction from the taxpayers for the support of reli-
gious organizations is a distinctive harm, one that is peculiarly likely to lead
to religious divisions and factional strife.
If this is so, it follows that governmental neutrality as between public and
private schools is not a constitutional imperative. Many taxpayers would
have severe objections to the public funding of religious schools. Indeed,
those objections are an inextricable part of the rationale behind the establish-
ment clause. An interpretation of the right to educate one's children that
would compel governmental neutrality would be inconsistent with the logic
of the religious guarantees themselves. Governmental neutrality would
probably not violate the establishment clause, but it would raise problems
sufficient to provide a justification for selective funding. 56
The second reason for this general conclusion is that any government has
strong and legitimate reasons to favor public over private education, in
order, for example, to foster the development of an integrated national or
state polity, to promote citizenship, 7 and to break down barriers of race,
4 See L.TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1275 & n.138.
5 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 510.
o A possible response to this argument is that private schools are not necessarily
religious schools, and that as a result, a decision not to fund private schools cannot be
supported by the desire to prevent taxpayer funding of religion. But it is probably
sufficient for these purposes that the vast majority of private schools are religious. It
would of course follow that there would be no constitutional problem if the government
decided to fund only secular schools, whether public or private.
51 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 ("That the state may do much, go very far,
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religion, and class.' These reasons are of course insufficient to permit an
outright governmental prohibition of private schools. But they are signifi-
cant enough to permit the government to fund public but not private
schools, and through that route to encourage attendance at public schools. 9
Government is thus constitutionally authorized to be neutral toward pri-
vate and public schools, but it is under no obligation to do so. A system in
which government may fund public schools but not private schools, and
allows its citizenry to opt out of the public school system at its own expense,
seems to be the best reconciliation of the competing interests-understood
through the lens of the constitutional structure generally and the first
amendment in particular. In this context, then, governmental selectivity is
permitted, not because of the absence of "penalty," but because of the pres-
ence of legitimate justifications.
B. Governmentally Funded Speech and Art
The question of governmentally funded speech and art has become espe-
cially controversial in recent years, because of troublesome selectivity in
funding decisions in the first instance and because of several highly visible
efforts to withdraw federal or state money from publicly disapproved
projects."° The general issue is likely to become even more heated in the
future. Government is quite frequently implicated in the funding and pro-
motion of the arts, and there are both legitimate and illegitimate reasons for
refusing to fund or withdrawing funds from certain programs. Some of these
cases are exceptionally difficult, and my conclusions should be regarded as
especially tentative.
It will be useful to begin by illustrating some permissible funding deci-
sions. The central point here is that government has limited resources with
indeed, in order to improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and morally is
clear .... ).
58 These ideas have a long legacy; they are ultimately traceable to Thomas Jefferson,
among others. See Notes on Virginia in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 196-97 (M.
Peterson ed. 1975).
In fact, however, the history of the actual practice suggests that the public schools were
generic protestant institutions created because of antipathy to Catholics, most of whom
were immigrants. All this raises some doubts about the conclusion ventured in the text.
If the public schools are an effort to create an orthodoxy rather than to break down
factionalism, the legitimacy of the underlying justification is drawn into question. There
is, moreover, a conceptual difficulty in distinguishing between the two.
59 Considerations of the sort suggested in this paragraph explain the basis of my
uneasiness with Professor McConnell's approach to this problem. See McConnell,
Unconstitutional Conditions: Unrecognized Implications for the Establishment Clause, 26
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 255, 275 (1989) (arguing that the government's decision not to fund
parochial schools constitutes a "flagrant burden" on constitutional rights).
60 These include depictions of Mayor Harold Washington dressed in a bra and panties,
Jesus Christ in urine, the American flag on the floor to be stepped on, art involving
AIDS, and sexually explicit art, including depictions of homosexuality.
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which to fund the arts and its allocations are necessarily selective. In this
area, generality on the part of government is inconceivable. From this point
at least three conclusions seem straightforward.
First, it is surely permissible for government to refuse to fund speech that
can be banned through the criminal law. A refusal to fund obscenity,
libelous speech, or incitement to crime is therefore unobjectionable. 1
Second, funding decisions that are based on qualitative or aesthetic
grounds should be entirely legitimate, at least presumptively and in most
cases. The government might properly decide to fund projects that it consid-
ers to be of high caliber. Indeed, such judgments are inescapable for those
who allocate limited resources.
Third, decisions to fund projects on the basis of subject matter should
generally be uncontroversial. For example, there should be no basis for
complaint if the government chooses to fund projects related to American
history, Chaucer, World War II, the civil rights movement, Egypt, or the
film industry. To say that government may be in the business of funding art
is almost by itself to say that government may select subjects or topics that it
considers worthy of approval. Here too the existence of limited funds makes
any alternative approach implausible.
Taken together, these conclusions should be sufficient to authorize the
bulk of current practice with respect to funding of the arts. In all of these
cases, government has legitimate reasons for selectivity. If government may
properly make decisions by reference to subject matter or to aesthetic qual-
ity, existing policies will generally be upheld.
Under what circumstances, then, might serious first amendment objec-
tions arise? The most obvious involve straightforward discrimination on the
basis of viewpoint. Suppose, for example, that government decides to fund
projects by Democrats but not Republicans, or only by those who have
voted in favor of the current President. The case is an easy one for invalida-
tion. The prohibition on discrimination based on point of view lies at the
heart of the first amendment.62 In this case, both the purpose and the effects
of governmental action are objectionable. Moreover, no distinctive, funding-
related justification is available to authorize the government's action. Here
the problem lies in the absence not of "coercion," but of legitimate reasons
for selectivity.
The only possible justification for viewpoint discrimination in this setting
would be the taxpayers' unwillingness to subsidize art by people they find
disagreeable. But a decision to admit this justification would allow funding
6 Of course there must be procedural guarantees to ensure that the speech at issue
actually falls in the unprotected class.
62 See Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV.
189, 192-93 (1983) (a "central first amendment concern" is the free communication of
individual points of view). See also Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)
("[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.").
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decisions to skew artistic creation in accordance with prevailing political
convictions, especially those of governmental actors. At least in a world in
which the government engages in a wide range of funding, that skewing
effect could not plausibly be tolerated. Even more fundamentally, the core
of the first amendment is offended by governmental efforts to skew
expression.
Slightly harder but also reasonably clear are cases in which government
decides to fund only projects that contain a particular, approved viewpoint.
Imagine, for example, a law stating that the National Endowment for the
Arts (NEA) will fund only those projects that deal favorably with the cur-
rent performance of the American government, or only projects involving
the Vietnam War that portray the government in a favorable light. An
across-the-board ban on the funding of projects critical of government or
embodying governmentally-disapproved views would at least usually be
impermissible. Here too the government cannot justify selectivity in consti-
tutionally acceptable terms.63
If these claims are broadly correct, it is possible to develop some tentative
conclusions. The clearest constitutional violation consists of discrimination
on the basis of point of view." Most other decisions will be permissible, for
they will involve subject matter or aesthetics. The hardest cases arise when
the relevant discrimination seems to involve judgments about subject matter
or aesthetics but is in fact an effort to control a particular point of view.
The problem is that the line between these two categories is an elusive
one-not only in the uninteresting sense that there will be hard intermediate
cases, but in the far more troubling sense that the distinction is difficult to
draw even as a conceptual matter. Judgments about aesthetics or quality
63 It follows that the action of the Chicago City Council in removing the offensive
painting of Harold Washington was unconstitutional because it was based on official
disapproval of a private decision to ridicule the former Mayor.
I say "at least usually" because even here there may be counterexamples. Suppose, for
example, that government says that funded portrayals of the Civil War cannot say that
slavery was a good thing, or that such portrayals will count against funding. Or suppose
that funding of a show about the American Revolution is limited to people who do not
portray the founders as murderers and thugs. Here even viewpoint discrimination may
be acceptable as part of qualitative judgments. See infra text accompanying notes 66-67.
64 There are lurking questions here about the government's own speech. Since
government seems to have plenary authority over what it will say, it is by no means clear
that government may not have similar authority over people whom it pays. Part of the
difference may lie in the fact that when government is speaking, the people know who the
speaker is; the same cannot be said when the government is paying a private person to say
what it wants. Part of the problem also lies in the fear of government cooptation of the
private sphere, a fear that retains authority even in a post-New Deal era-although it
introduces some of the difficulties criticized in Part I of this essay. It would in any case
be intolerable to say that grant recipients are government employees and thus without
constitutional protection against viewpoint discrimination; such a conclusion would lead
to unacceptable skewing of artistic decisions.
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always depend, at root, on the standpoint of the decisionmaker.1 This is
most obvious for people who think that art celebrating Nazism, Commu-
nism, or white supremacy, at least ordinarily, cannot qualify as good art.
But the point extends quite generally. Distinctions between representational
and nonrepresentational art, or embroidery and painting, involve issues that
are at bottom political. The idea that yellow marks smeared on a page, a
sentimental drawing of a cat, or American flags marked with swastikas do
not qualify for funding is necessarily rooted in views, broadly speaking polit-
ical in nature, about the appropriate character and aims of the arts.
The available approaches to these difficulties are few-indeed, there are
only three realistic options, and none of them is entirely appealing. The first
posits a constitutional principle forbidding even aesthetic or subject-matter
judgments on the ground that they too are rooted in moral or political judg-
ments and, in that sense, in point of view. But this principle would be intol-
erable, for it would forbid selective funding of any sort and so also bar
government funding entirely. Such a solution would hardly be desirable in a
system in which public funding is an important individual and collective
good, especially because public funding removes some of the distortions cre-
ated by private funding of the artistic process.
The second route would be to permit even the most conspicuously parti-
san funding decisions on the ground that sensible lines cannot be drawn
between impermissibly partisan and permissibly neutral decisions. This
approach would also be intolerable, because it would authorize egregious
governmental interference with expression for the state's own self-interested
or otherwise objectionable purposes.
The third and probably the only sensible solution is to apply the constitu-
tional prohibition only in straightforward cases of viewpoint discrimina-
tion," and to permit aesthetic or qualitative judgments as long as they are
not conspicuously based on partisan aims. Of course this approach must be
accompanied by a recognition that it rests on some conceptually uncertain
ground.
Under this framework, there are two final hard cases. The first involves a
restriction that does not on its face discriminate on the basis of viewpoint,
but that amounts to an attempt to impose conventional morality on artistic
processes. The second involves hate literature or art that offends a signifi-
cant portion of the community because it is degrading.
For an example of the first problem, suppose that government says that it
will refuse to fund projects containing profanity or sexually explicit scenes.
The concern here is that in such cases, government will distort artistic
processes by imposing financial pressures that incline people toward offi-
61 And that standpoint is rarely without political content. For an especially. good
discussion of this issue, see W. BOOTH, THE COMPANY OF FRIENDS (1989).
" Whether it is straightforward is, unfortunately, itself in part a function of point of
view. See Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589
(discussing justifications for anti-pornography legislation).
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cially sanctioned views about what is fitting in art. In a system containing
some public funding, this problem cannot be altogether avoided. But it can
be minimized rather than increased. The appropriate strategy here is proba-
bly to view with some suspicion across-the-board measures that deny fund-
ing to art that offends conventional morality-a conclusion that will of
course produce formidable line-drawing problems. The more narrow and
selective the exclusionary term, the more it will be properly characterized as
viewpoint-based: a ban on depictions of homosexuality is in this sense even
more troublesome than a ban on depictions of sexuality in general.
The argument for constitutionality in these cases is strengthened, how-
ever, if the regulation has a limited spatial and temporal reach. Cases
involving general regulations-those imposing a nationwide statutory ban
on, for example, profanity in funded projects-should, if borderline, be
resolved unfavorably to the government. A decision by the NEA to forbid
the funding of all art with nudity would be far more objectionable than a
decision not to allow nudity in one or two governmentally-funded projects.
The latter would have some of the familiar characteristics of time, place, and
manner restrictions. Indeed, some viewpoint-based restrictions will be per-
missible if they are narrow in terms of space and time. A local exhibit on the
civil rights movement could surely exclude art celebrating slavery or advo-
cating its reinstatement.
The second category, involving hate literature or art, is also troublesome.
What if the government decides, for example, not to fund Nazi art, pro-
slavery art, art of the Ku Klux Klan, art glorifying rape and sexual violence,
or Rushdie's The Satanic Verses, on the ground that the relevant causes are
filled with hatred, are harmful and abhorrent, or are perceived as harmful
and abhorrent by a large segment of the community? The basic problem
here, noted above, is that conventional morality is not the proper arbiter of
governmental funding decisions that bear on expression. A system in which
conventional morality played that role would be inconsistent with the core of
the first amendment guarantee, which is designed precisely to protect views
that do not accord with conventional morality. What is required, in these
cases, is a principle of sufficient generality to encompass any legitimate con-
cerns about the use of taxpayer money without at the same time impermissi-
bly dictating a particular point of view.
It is not easy to devise any such principle. Surely government should not
be permitted to decline to fund any project to which a significant number of
taxpayers have a conscientious objection. Such a proposition would enshrine
conventional morality as the basis for funding decisions. Perhaps, however,
government should be permitted to decline to fund projects that fuel hatred
of disadvantaged social groups, at least if the category of regulated speech
can be narrowly defined. To be sure, such an approach would embody a
form of viewpoint discrimination. There is, however, at least a plausible
argument for such an exception in this context. Speech of the sort at issue is
not merely offensive, but also helps produce a distinctive set of harms,
including a perpetuation of second-class citizenship for certain groups. Gov-
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ernment might have sufficient reason to refuse to fund such speech even if it
may not criminalize it.
It follows from these considerations that government has broad power to
allocate funds to artistic projects, even if it does so on a highly selective
basis. The only clear prohibition is on allocations based on a straightfor-
wardly partisan basis, as in the case of discrimination against a particular
point of view; and even here there are exceptions. A similar prohibition
might be triggered when a subject-matter restriction also embodies a form of
viewpoint discrimination, as in the exclusion of art containing profanity; and
here much will depend on the particular context. Hard cases will of course
remain. But such an approach would resolve the vast majority of cases, and
at least suggest an orientation for the rest.
C. Funding Abortions In Cases of Rape or Incest
The Supreme Court has held that the existence of a right to an abortion
does not imply a correlative right to public funding of abortion, even if the
government is also funding childbirth. 7 In this respect, the right to have an
abortion stands on the same footing as the right to send one's children to
public schools. In neither case is neutrality required.
I want to explore here the question whether the government might be
obliged to fund abortions in cases of rape or incest, at least when government
is funding childbirth in such cases. I do not speak to the question whether
these considerations suggest that funding for abortions is required even in
cases not involving rape or incest. That broader question raises distinctive
and more difficult problems.
Under current law, government is almost certainly" under no obligation
to pay for abortion in cases of rape or incest. No matter what produced the
pregnancy, taxpayers are not required to foot the bill for abortions. In the
relevant cases, the Court has not been clear about its rationale. It has
insisted that government need not remain neutral as between abortion and
childbirth; the legitimate interest in protecting fetal life is the reason that
neutrality is not compelled.69 In this quite particular respect, the abortion
right is similar to that in Pierce v. Society of Sisters: the government has an
interest in nonneutrality that does not have sufficient force to justify
criminalization, but that does allow selectivity in funding.
In the setting of private schools, we have seen that this line of argument is
correct, largely because of the authority of the establishment clause, which is
best taken as a self-conscious protection against the use of taxpayer funds to
67 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1980) (stating that a woman's right to
choose an abortion does not carry with it a constitutional entitlement to the financial
resources necessary to exercise that right).
8 The Supreme Court has not, however, decided the precise issue, which has never
been presented to it.
69 Harris, 448 U.S. at 324-26.
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pay for religious schools.7° But this rationale seems unavailable in the abor-
tion context. There would be no tension with the establishment clause if
those having religious or other objections to abortion were forced to pay for
that procedure. Indeed, taxpayers are quite generally forced to pay for
things-for example, national defense, welfare, certain forms of art-to
which they have powerful moral objections. If government is to be relieved
of its obligation to be neutral as between abortion and childbirth in cases of
rape and incest, the argument must take a somewhat different form.
Perhaps one could generalize from the establishment clause, or from the
structure of liberal democracy generally, a principle allowing substantial seg-
ments of the public not to pay for practices that it considers to be abhorrent
for reasons of conscience.71 In most democratic countries, governments are
permitted and indeed encouraged to take account of conscientious objec-
tions. This permission may not be an enforceable entitlement, but it does
provide a generally legitimate reason for selective funding. Of course, this
permission could not be invoked to allow government to violate obligations
of neutrality that seem a straightforward inference from the relevant right-
such as the first amendment right to neutrality among points of view, or the
equal protection right to neutrality between blacks and whites. But perhaps
some rights are best conceived as nonneutrality rights in the sense that they
allow selectivity in funding decisions if taxpayers have an objection of con-
science. And since many taxpayers consider abortion to be murder of
defenseless human beings, perhaps they can refuse to pay for it, even in cases
of rape and incest.
At least as a general rule, it seems not merely correct but obvious to say
that funding decisions may and often do take into account the desires of the
citizenry, including conscientious objections.72 It is unclear, however, what
weight such objections should have in hard constitutional cases. If the rele-
vant constitutional provision requires neutrality, consideration of conscien-
tious objections is probably illegitimate and, in any case, insufficiently
weighty to justify selective decisionmaking. A decision to fund Christian but
not Jewish art, or paintings favorable to Republicans, would be plainly
unconstitutional. In cases in which the right does not call for neutrality,
conscientious objections are easily translatable into sufficient governmental
justifications to survive review.
To evaluate the arguments for and against neutrality in the abortion fund-
70 See supra text accompanying notes 54-59.
71 See McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and Religious Schools
(unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter McConnell manuscript]; McConnell, supra note
59, at 265-71.
72 Some such desires are of course constitutionally unacceptable. See, e.g., Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 447-50 (1985) (holding that an ordinance
requiring a special use permit for a proposed home for mentally retarded persons lacks a
rational basis and deprives respondent of equal protection). But here the question to be
decided is whether the objection to abortion is unacceptable in that sense.
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ing context, it is necessary to understand the nature of and basis for the right
at issue. If the abortion right is seen as one of "privacy," there are good
reasons to say that governmental neutrality is not required, and that govern-
ment may fund childbirth but not abortion regardless of whether the preg-
nancy is consensual or coercive.73 Indeed, if the right is one to privacy, it is
plausible to say that the conscientious objections of a significant segment of
the population provide a sufficient justification for refusing to fund
abortions.74
There are, however, notorious difficulties in treating the abortion right as
one of privacy, not least because the Constitution does not refer to "privacy"
and because the abortion decision does not involve conventional privacy at
all.75 Certainly, in the case of abortions involving rape or incest, the best
argument on behalf of the relevant right is based on principles of equal pro-
tection rather than on due process.76 This argument stresses issues of sex
discrimination and views a prohibition on abortion as an involuntary coopta-
tion of women's bodies in the service of third parties.77
13 See McConnell manuscript, supra note 71.
74 Id.
75 Perhaps the right is one to liberty or autonomy. Liberty is of course protected by
the due process clause, and the notion that that clause has a substantive component,
though textually and historically controversial, is well-engrained in American law. But if
the argument that follows in the text is correct, that understanding inadequately captures
the dynamics of the abortion question.
76 There appears to be a mounting consensus to this effect with respect to abortion
generally. See C. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 93-102 (1987) (criticizing the
doctrinal choice to pursue the abortion right under the law of privacy); L.TRIBE, supra
note 2, at 1353 (stating that "the failure of both plaintiffs and courts to frame the abortion
controversy in terms of sexual equality has profoundly affected the law in this area");
Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63
N.C.L. REv. 375 (1985) (invoking sexual equality and suggesting that Roe may have been
less vulnerable to attack had the Court limited its ruling to the specific statute at issue);
Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV.
1, 43 (1977) ("The equal protection clause has not only taken on substantive content of
the type envisioned by its framers, but shows every sign of being able to bear the full
meaning of the equal citizenship principle."); Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 987-1002 (1984) (noting that the "failure to develop a sex
equality doctrine that is more responsive to biological difference has affected the Court's
analysis in cases challenging explicit sex-based classifications"); Schauer, Easy Cases, 58
S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 431 n.83 (1985) (stating that if Roe had been decided as a sex-
discrimination case, "the decision would have become a legitimate interpretation ...
within the textual mandate of the equal protection clause"); Strauss, Discriminatory
Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 935, 990-98 (1989) (examining Roe
as a sex discrimination/equal protection case).
17 An argument of this general sort is made in Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77
MICH. L. REV. 1569 (1979) (suggesting, under equal protection principles, that requiring
women to carry a fetus to term compels women to be Good Samaritans); Thompson, A
Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 52 (1971) ("The question asked is what a
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The first point here is that restrictions on abortion uniquely burden
women. A statute that is addressed at women by plain terms is of course a
form of sex discrimination. A statute that involves a biological correlate of
being female should be treated in the same way.7" The fact that what is to
many another life-that of the fetus-is involved is of course extremely
important. The practice of abortion plausibly involves the death of another
human being, one who is especially defenseless; and conscientious objections
that invoke fetal protection deserve a response. But that fact goes to the
issue of justification, not to the question whether there is discrimination in
the first instance.
It is important to recall here that the biological capacity to bear children,
frequently taken as the basis for women's "natural" role, in fact has the
social consequence of involuntary childbearing only as a result of collective
decisions, conspicuous among them the legal prohibition of abortion. The
question at hand is whether government has the power through law to turn
that capacity, limited to one gender, into a source of social disadvantage.
The recognition of the Roe79 right sees the biological capacity as having no
necessary social consequences, and treating the role of motherhood for
women as chosen rather than given,8" to be selected by women rather than
by the state. At the very least this seems to be the best argument in cases of
rape or incest. In those cases, the question is whether the state's interest in
protecting the fetus allows the state to compel women to bring the fetus to
term.
Is the state's justification sufficient? The argument to the contrary would
be that in cases in which women are not responsible for their pregnancies,
the state may not conscript women in order to protect another life, whether
fetal or not. This is so partly because the notion that women should be
coopted in this way is in fact a product of sex discrimination, in the form of
third party may do, and what a mother may do, if mentioned at all, is reduced to an
afterthought ...."). Issues of sexual inequality are not, however, sufficiently emphasized
in those treatments.
78 This argument is developed in Brief for National Coalition Against Domestic
Violence, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989) (No. 88-605)
[hereinafter Webster Briefi and I am grateful to my co-author, David Strauss, with whom
most of the ideas in this and succeeding paragraphs were developed.
An argument to the contrary might stress that statutes directed at biological correlates
of sex are less likely to reflect prejudice and stereotyping. There is, after all, a real
difference here, and the legislation might be responding sensibly to it. But it is doubtful
whether an approach to sex discrimination should be based on an inquiry into whether
there are real differences. See C. MACKINNON, supra note 76, at 40 ("Gender might not
even code as difference ... were it not for its consequences for social power."). Even if it
should be, pregnancy is a particular kind of real difference, one whose exclusive targeting
is in fact likely to reflect prejudice or subordination.
79 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
80 See Held, Birth and Death, in FEMINISM AND POLITICAL THEORY (C. Sunstein ed.
1990).
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impermissible stereotypes about the role of women in society. The history
unambiguously supports the claim that restrictions on abortion are closely
tied up with traditional and now-impermissible ideas about women's proper
role."'
Two additional factors support this line of argument. First, outside of the
abortion context, the government never imposes similar obligations on its
citizens, even when human life is uncontroversially at stake.82 In the abor-
tion context, the striking inequality of imposing the burden of bodily coopta-
tion on women alone suggests that the interest in protection of human life-
if invoked as the basis for selective impositions and when pregnancy is invol-
untary-is inadequate, or can be found adequate only as a result of imper-
missible sex role stereotypes.
The second factor is that in the real world, the consequence of a restric-
tion on abortion is not materially to save fetal lives, but instead to lead
women to procure dangerous abortions with increased risks to women them-
selves. The abortion rate has not increased dramatically as a result of the
decision in Roe. 3 Indeed, some estimates suggest that before Roe, 5,000 to
10,000 women died per year as a result of incompetently performed, illegal
abortions, and that nearly as many abortions were performed before Roe as
now." Even if these statistics are overstated, the principal effect of Roe was
not to increase fetal deaths, but instead to produce a shift from dangerous to
safe abortions.8" If this is so, restrictions on abortion do not materially
advance the end of protecting fetal life.
These arguments have the advantage of making it unnecessary to decide
on the moral status of the fetus. Even if the fetus has all of the status of
human life, involuntarily pregnant women cannot be conscripted in order to
protect it. To put it bluntly: the question is not whether women may kill
fetuses but instead whether the state may enlist women's bodies in the pro-
tection of third parties, however defenseless. In view of the inequality in the
imposition of such burdens, the connection between restrictions on abortion
and impermissible stereotypes, and the unlikelihood that such burdens will
promote their own purposes, the answer seems to be negative.
If arguments of this sort are accepted, might government fund childbirth
81 K. LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 162 (1984) (stating
that for those seeking to restrict abortions, "abortion is wrong because by giving women
control over their fertility ... it fosters and supports a world view that deemphasizes...
the traditional roles of men and women"). The connection is an historical one, rather
than a logical or necessary one.
82 There are no compulsory kidney transplants, for example, even for fathers or
mothers. See L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1354-55. Of course, no analogy to pregnancy
will be precise.
83 See sources cited infra note 85; See also Webster Brief, supra note 78, at 17-18.
4 Webster Brief, supra note 78, at 19.
85 See J. BONAR, H. RODMAN, B. SARVIs, THE ABORTION QUESTION 191 (1987); G.
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (forthcoming 1991).
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but not abortion in cases of rape or incest? If Roe is treated as a case in
which government is not permitted to turn biological capacities into social
disadvantages, it is hard to see why the abortion right, at least limited to
such cases, should not be a right to governmental neutrality. The reason is
that the very deneutralizing that underlies Roe itself seems to forbid a dis-
tinction between funding and criminalization. A refusal to fund is merely
another form of government cooptation. To be sure, the protection of poten-
tial life is a legitimate state interest, but if the interest is insufficient to out-
weigh the right in the criminal context, it is not clear why it suffices in the
setting of funding. For cases of rape and incest, a selective funding decision
has precisely the consequence of turning women into involuntary incubators.
The relevant right is best characterized as akin to the first amendment right
to neutrality with respect to point of view.86 If the right is to equal protec-
tion, the conscientious objections of the taxpayers should count no more
here than in the first amendment context, or in the setting of race or sex
discrimination in allocating funds for social security.
At least this perspective will seem persuasive if funding decisions are not
treated as an artificial supplement to a natural or spontaneous social order-
the central instinct behind Harris v. McRae 87-and if the ideas that gave rise
to the regulatory state are taken seriously. Viewed through the lens of the
New Deal period, the failure to fund is not inaction at all. It represents a
conscious social choice, one that conscripts women in the cause of incuba-
tion, rather than simply letting "nature" take its course.' If poverty is seen
not as part of nature, but instead as a predictable consequence of a system of
collective choices, governmental decisions that turn poverty and biology into
a basis for the creation of the status of involuntary incubators seem to run
afoul of the equal protection clause.
III. CONCLUSION
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine, nominally designed as an effort
to adapt constitutional doctrines to the regulatory state, is rooted in intu-
itions that are deeply incompatible with the understandings that gave rise to
modern government. The doctrine is therefore an anachronism. It is also
too crude and too general to provide help in dealing with contested cases.
There is no need to ask whether government has subsidized rather than
penalized, or threatened rather than offered. We might substitute for those
unhelpful and probably unanswerable questions a more direct and constitu-
tionally-grounded inquiry into, first, the nature of the incursion on the rele-
81 Indeed, a refusal to fund abortion at all, in cases of rape and incest, might raise
serious constitutional questions.
87 448 U.S. 297 (1980). See L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES (1986) (arguing
that "those who would outlaw abortion (or who would refuse to fund it) would rely upon
economic and physiological circumstances-the supposed dictates of the natural-to
conscript women (at least poor women) as incubators").
88 See T. POGGE, supra note 28, at 11; L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1354.
[Vol. 70:593
HeinOnline  -- 70 B.U. L. Rev. 620 1990
1990] UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE 621
vant right, and second, the legitimacy and strength of the government's
justifications for any such incursion. 9 On this view, there will not be one
unconstitutional conditions problem, but a variable set of results depending
on the nature of the particular constitutional prohibition at issue.
This reformulation of the problem raised by licensing, employment, and
spending programs departs from a model of coercion in favor of a model of
reasons. But the reformulation does not by itself resolve concrete cases. In
order to accomplish that task, it will be necessary to rely on views about
what sorts of rights the Constitution protects, and about what sorts of justifi-
cations are legitimate and sufficiently weighty. But an unconstitutional con-
ditions doctrine could never be helpful on those issues. The doctrine is
neither necessary nor sufficient for their resolution.
Moreover, the reformulation suggested here need not imply more or fewer
occasions for judicial invalidation of legislation. Whether the reformulation
leads to more or less invalidation depends on the substantive understandings
that are brought to bear in the cases. It would be odd to take the existence
of the regulatory state as a reason to apply rational basis review to all meas-
ures that burden what might otherwise be seen as constitutional rights. The
regulatory state merely provides new and different occasions for constitu-
tional scrutiny. To say that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is an
anachronism is emphatically not to say that all spending, licensing, employ-
ment, and regulatory measures will be subject to deferential or no judicial
review.
I have also argued that properly interpreted, the relevant provisions per-
mit government to pay for public but not private schools; allow government
to be highly selective in funding art and other expression, subject to a prohi-
bition on viewpoint discrimination; but forbid government from refusing to
pay the expenses of abortion in cases of rape and incest, at least if govern-
ment pays for childbirth in such cases. Whether or not these conclusions are
persuasive, the broader point remains. In a mature legal system, one that
has adapted to the functions and goals of the modern regulatory state, we
will not need, and therefore we will not have, an unconstitutional conditions
doctrine.
89 A characteristic feature of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine-the inquiry
into the germaneness of the condition to the program, see generally Sullivan, supra note 3,
at 1458-68-should be understood as a means of flushing out impermissible reasons, and
of ensuring that legitimate reasons are in fact at work. This task can readily be
performed under the reformation suggested here.
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